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FACING REALITY: THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
FALLS SHORT FOR WOMEN UNDERGOING INFERTILITY
TREATMENT
Katie Cushing∗

I.

INTRODUCTION

Having a child is a major life event around which most Americans build their lives. For millions of couples in the United States,
finding out that they are unable to conceive is a crushing emotional
1
blow. Increasingly, infertile couples are placing their hopes of having a child in infertility treatments, most commonly through in-vitro
2
fertilization (IVF). Women who choose to undergo IVF, however,
face two risks in the employment setting. The first is that insurers or
employers will deny insurance coverage for the treatment and, thus,
make IVF impossible to afford. Second, and worse, is the risk that the
potential mother’s employer will terminate her for taking time off to
undergo infertility treatment. Do women have legal recourse to
combat refusal of insurance or adverse employment actions? The answer to this question remains unclear despite a significant amount of
3
litigation and scholarship in this area. Even so, it seems that women
have some protection against adverse employment actions, but they
still have no legal means of requiring employers to provide insurance
4
coverage for infertility treatments.
In 1978, Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
5
6
1964 to include the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA). The PDA
∗

J.D., 2010, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., magna cum laude, 2007,
The College of New Jersey. The author would like to thank her family and friends
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editor, Bradford Muller, and Professor Charles Sullivan for their guidance and advice
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1
See STAFF OF RESOLVE WITH DIANE ARONSON, RESOLVING INFERTILITY 40–41 (Diane
N. Clapp & Margaret R. Hollister eds., 1999) [hereinafter ARONSON].
2
Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Assisted Reproductive Technology, http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last visited Mar. 14,
2010).
3
See infra Parts V–VI.
4
See infra Part VII.
5
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2006).
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defined sex discrimination as including discrimination on the basis of
7
“pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” Thus, Congress made clear that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy consti8
tuted discrimination on the basis of sex. Since the enactment of the
PDA, however, the lower federal courts as well as the courts of appeals have struggled to define its scope. One of the most significant
and controversial issues confronting the judiciary today is the confusion surrounding infertility treatments, particularly IVF, and whether
women undergoing IVF have any protection under the PDA. Recent9
ly, in Hall v. Nalco Co., the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
held that adverse employment actions based on a woman’s need to
take time off to undergo IVF constituted discrimination on the basis
10
of the gender-specific condition of childbearing capacity. In effect,
the court recognized that an infertile female employee terminated
for receiving IVF could maintain an action against her employer pur11
suant to the PDA. Unfortunately, even after Hall, the PDA falls
short in a significant way—it does not require that employers provide
12
insurance coverage for infertility treatments.
This Comment surveys the law surrounding infertility treatments
and gender discrimination and concludes that the legal protection
for female employees undergoing IVF is disappointing and inadequate. Part II of this Comment discusses the causes and prevalence
of infertility as well as the various treatments available for infertile
couples, specifically IVF. Part III then examines the history of the
13
PDA, including the Supreme Court case that prompted Congress to
enact the PDA. Next, Part IV looks at two of the Supreme Court cases
14
that followed the enactment of the PDA, which provide some guidance to the lower courts in interpreting the PDA. Part V summarizes
three cases from the courts of appeals and their respective approaches in interpreting the PDA in the context of infertility treatments.
6

See § 2000e(k).
Id.
8
Congress “change[d] the definition of sex discrimination in title VII to reflect
the ‘commonsense’ view and to insure that working women are protected against all
forms of employment discrimination based on sex.” S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 3 (1977).
9
534 F.3d 644 (7th Cir. 2008).
10
Id. at 645.
11
Id. at 649.
12
See discussion infra Part VI.
13
See Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1964 Amendments
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978).
14
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
7
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Part VI analyzes the three cases and explores the strengths and limitations of each court’s approach. Finally, Part VII asserts that Congress
should amend the PDA to clarify the scope of “related medical conditions” to provide more protection to women undergoing IVF against
adverse employment actions like terminations and demotions. Furthermore, Part VII concludes that existing federal statutes, such as
15
the PDA, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Family
16
and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), are the inappropriate legal tools to
compel employers to provide coverage for infertility treatment because they were not designed for this type of claim. Additionally,
state laws are limited in scope and lack the benefit of uniformity. Instead, this Comment suggests that the most promising avenue for obtaining insurance coverage for infertility treatments is through lobbying Congress to pass legislation like the proposed Family Building Act
of 2009, which is designed to address the financial needs of infertile
couples seeking fertility treatment.
II. INFERTILITY: A PHYSICAL DISEASE AND AN EMOTIONAL
ROLLERCOASTER
Infertility is a serious and widespread condition affecting approximately 7.3 million couples of reproductive age in the United
17
States. It is a disease of the reproductive system that interferes with
one of the human body’s most basic functions—the ability to repro18
duce. Infertility is a term used to describe one’s inability to become
19
pregnant after one year of sexual intercourse without conception.
15

42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006).
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006).
17
In 1992, Congress enacted the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to 7 (2006), which requires that each assisted reproductive
technology (ART) clinic in the United States report its annual pregnancy success
rates to the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
ARONSON, supra note 1, at 189. The CDC uses data compiled and published by the
Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART), an affiliate organization of
the American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM). Id. In the United States
in 2002, about 7.3 million of approximately 61.6 million women, fifteen to forty-four
years of age, received some kind of infertility services at some time in their lives. See
Anjani Chandra et al., Fertility, Family Planning, and Reproductive Health of U.S. Women:
Data from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth, in DATA FROM THE NATIONAL
SURVEY OF FAMILY GROWTH, at 29 (Nat’l Ctr. for Health Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., Vital and Health Statistics Series No. 23, 2005), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
series/sr_23/sr23_025.pdf.
18
Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Quick Facts About Infertility,
http://www.asrm.org/detail.aspx?id=2322 (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
19
ARONSON, supra note 1, at 5.
16
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Occurring equally in both men and women, infertility does not dis20
criminate on the basis of sex. About one third of infertility cases can
be attributed to male factors, one third to female factors, and the remaining one third is because of either a combination of male and
21
female factors or is unexplained.
In addition to its physical aspects, infertility provokes strong
22
emotions, such as grief, anger, and guilt. Most couples dream of
23
having a family and assume that they can have children one day.
When that possibility is jeopardized by an infertility diagnosis, it can
24
be an extremely painful and difficult reality to face. In fact, an infertility diagnosis engenders such intense emotional feelings that
25
mental health professionals consider it a life crisis. “Coping with infertility requires the same kind of psychological and physical strength
as does coping with the death of a parent, a divorce, or a life26
threatening disease.” While infertility is a frightening and emotional diagnosis for many couples, an increasing number of treatment op27
tions are available. Still, understanding the severe emotional effects
of infertility is essential to improving the legal protection for women
pursuing such treatment options; legal change cannot come about
until infertility treatment is accepted as a necessity rather than a luxury.
Today, infertility is no longer a taboo issue, mainly because of
the advances in medical technology that have led to a number of
treatment options and have given hope to millions of infertile
28
couples. Some treatment options include fertility drugs and hormonal treatments, surgery, and assisted reproductive technologies
29
(ARTs).
The U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDC) defines ARTs as “‘all treatments or procedures that involve
the handling of human eggs and sperm for the purpose of helping a
30
woman become pregnant.’” The number of ART cycles performed
20

Id. at 7.
Am. Pregnancy Ass’n, What is Infertility?, http://www.americanpregnancy.org
/infertility/whatisinfertility.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2010).
22
ARONSON, supra note 1, at 40–41.
23
Id. at 40.
24
See id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
See infra text accompanying note 29.
28
ARONSON, supra note 1, at 6.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 175 (quoting Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs.). ART includes “in vitro fertilization (IVF), gamete intrafallopian
21
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each year doubled from 1996 to 2005 because of, in part, the correla31
tion between age and fertility. As men and women age, they expe32
rience a significant decline in fertility. With more women waiting
33
until their thirties and forties to have children, an increasing num34
ber of women are turning to ARTs to achieve pregnancy.
This Comment is primarily concerned with IVF, the most com35
monly used ART. IVF is a procedure in which fertilization occurs
36
outside of the woman’s body in a laboratory dish. IVF is used to
treat infertility problems, such as tubal factor, endometriosis, male
37
factor, and unexplained infertility. Even when a male-factor causes
infertility, the woman must undergo IVF because the procedure re38
quires that the embryos be placed in the uterus. While IVF offers
many couples the possibility of building a family, the process and cost
of treatment is often an arduous and stressful journey that may inter-

transfer (GIFT), zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), embryo cryopreservation, egg
or embryo donation, and gestational carriers. . . . ART does not include intrauterine
insemination (IUI).” Id. ARTs, like IVF, involve four basic steps: ovulation stimulation and egg maturation, egg retrieval, fertilization, and embryo placement in the
uterus. CAROL TURKINGTON & MICHAEL M. ALPER, UNDERSTANDING FERTILITY AND
INFERTILITY: THE SOURCEBOOK FOR REPRODUCTIVE PROBLEMS, TREATMENTS, AND ISSUES
40–41 (2003).
31
“The number of ART cycles performed in the United States has more than
doubled, from 64,681 cycles in 1996 to 134,260 in 2005.” CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 2005 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS RATES 61 (2007), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ART/
ART2005/508PDF/2005ART508.pdf [hereinafter CDC SUCCESS RATES].
32
See ARONSON, supra note 1, at 11; see also TURKINGTON & ALPER, supra note 30, at
10–11 (“[B]ecause eggs are some of the longest-living cells in the body, there is a
greater risk that the eggs may be defective with each subsequent year of life.”).
33
The birth rate for women aged forty to forty four increased nearly twofold
from 48,607 births in 1990 to 95,788 births in 2002. Joyce A. Martin et al., U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., Births: Final Data for 2002, 2003 NAT’L VITAL STAT. REP.,
Dec. 17, 2003, at 6, available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/
nvsr/nvsr52/nvsr52_10.pdf; see David E. Williams, More Hurdles as Women Delay Birth,
CNN.COM, Apr. 24, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/04/21/later.childbirth/
(explaining that more women over the age of thirty five gave birth to more than
586,000 babies in the United States in 2004, which comprised approximately 14% of
births that year and marked an increase from 5% fifteen years earlier).
34
The average age of women receiving ART services was thirty six in 2005. CDC
SUCCESS RATES, supra note 31, at 15.
35
“IVF currently accounts for about 98% of ART procedures.” Am. Pregnancy
Ass’n,
What
is
Infertility?,
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/infertility
/whatisinfertility.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2010).
36
ARONSON, supra note 1, at 176. In-vitro is Latin for “in glass.” Id.
37
Id. at 177.
38
See id. at 155, 176.
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39

fere with one’s work and social obligations. Each IVF cycle may require weeks to complete, and if a pregnancy does not result, many
40
IVF cycles may be required.
With the average cost of an IVF cycle in the United States being
41
$12,400, IVF is an expensive procedure. In addition to the emotional and physical obstacles that infertility causes, many women will
face financial obstacles relating to two different employer actions:
their employer may refuse to provide insurance coverage or a health
plan that includes infertility treatments, and their employer may terminate them for taking time off from work to undergo infertility
treatment. Thus, financial obstacles may force women who cannot
afford infertility treatment without insurance coverage or who have to
forgo infertility treatment to avoid losing their job to abandon their
dream of having a family. Whether infertile women have legal re42
course to overcome these obstacles is still unclear.
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S 1978 DECISION IN GILBERT LED TO THE
ENACTMENT OF THE PDA
Congress enacted the PDA in 1978 in response to the United
43
States Supreme Court decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, in
which the Court held that discrimination based on pregnancy did not
44
constitute discrimination based on sex.
In a class-action suit

39

See RESOLVE: The Nat’l Infertility Ass’n, Making Treatment Affordable,
http://www.resolve.org/site/PageServer?pagename=lrn_mta_home (last visited Apr.
1, 2010).
Infertility exacts an enormous toll on both the affected individuals and
on society. Women and men in their most active and productive years
are distracted by the physical, financial and emotional hardships of this
disease. Infertility is more than a disease, it is a devastating life crisis
which can greatly impact the health, relationships, job performance
and social interactions. Added to the emotional and physical toll exacted by infertility is the financial burden carried by many seeking
treatment.
Id.
40
See MAYO CLINIC FAMILY HEALTH BOOK 1069–70 (Scott C. Litin et al. eds., 3d ed.
2003). An IVF cycle normally begins with requiring the woman to take ovulationstimulating drugs. TURKINGTON & ALPER, supra note 26, at 41. The eggs are then
surgically removed and mixed with the sperm in a Petri dish. Id. at 42. If the eggs
have been fertilized by the sperm, then the fertilized eggs, or embryos, are placed in
the uterus. Id.
41
Am. Pregnancy Ass’n, supra note 21.
42
See discussion infra Parts V–VI.
43
429 U.S. 125 (1976), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076.
44
Id. at 139–40.
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brought by several female General Electric employees, the Court addressed the question of whether Title VII’s prohibition on sex dis45
46
crimination applied to pregnancy-based discrimination. The female employees at General Electric challenged the company’s
disability plan, which provided extensive coverage for all “nonoccupational sickness and accident benefits” but excluded from its coverage
47
disabilities arising from pregnancy.
In reaching its decision, the Gilbert Court relied primarily on its
48
decision two years earlier in Geduldig v. Aiello, in which the Court
had held that pregnancy discrimination is not sex discrimination un49
der the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Gilbert, the Court again employed the Geduldig reasoning to conclude
that the disability plan distinguished not between men and women
but between pregnant persons and nonpregnant persons of both sex50
es. Accordingly, the Gilbert Court held that because the nonpregnant class consisted of both men and women, the plan did not consti51
tute sex discrimination on either its face or its impact on women —
even though the Court noted that the category of pregnant persons
52
could necessarily include only female employees. The Court rea-

45
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee regarding the “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”
on the basis of the employee’s sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
46
See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 129. The plaintiffs claimed that General Electric’s refusal to pay disability benefits under the company’s insurance plan for time lost because
of pregnancy and childbirth constituted discrimination on the basis of sex. Id.
47
Id. at 127.
48
417 U.S. 484 (1974), superseded by statute, Pregnancy Discrimination Act of
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. In Geduldig, female workers sued the state
for excluding pregnancy and related medical disabilities from coverage under California’s mandatory state disability compensation program. Id. at 486, 489–90. Under a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection analysis, the Court held that the
plan’s exclusion of pregnancy disabilities was constitutionally valid because the plan
did not discriminate between men and women but, rather, between pregnant and
nonpregnant persons (the latter of which included both men and women). Id. at
494, 496 & n.20, 497. The Court upheld the California disability law that excluded
insurance for pregnancy-related disabilities. Id. at 494–97.
49
Id. at 494.
50
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 135 (“‘The lack of identity between the excluded disability
and gender as such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides potential recipients into two groups—pregnant
women and nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the
second includes members of both sexes.’” (quoting Geduldig, 417 U.S. at 496 n.20)).
51
Id. at 138–39.
52
Id. at 134 (“While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not
follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based classification.”).
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soned that the insurance program covered the “same categories of
53
risk” for both men and women and that pregnancy constituted an
54
“an additional risk, unique to women,” for which employers were not
55
required to provide “greater economic benefits.” In other words,
the Court held that women were not entitled to benefits greater than
those provided to men just because they are susceptible to an “extra”
56
risk—pregnancy.
The majority’s opinion in Gilbert produced two dissents, one
57
from Justice Brennan and one from Justice Stevens. In his dissent,
joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Brennan asserted that the majori58
59
ty’s reasoning was “fanciful” and “transparent” in ignoring the real60
Justice
ity that all pregnant persons will necessarily be women.
Brennan argued that General Electric’s disability plan violated Title
VII because excluding coverage on the basis of pregnancy is the same
61
as excluding coverage on the basis of sex. In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens declared that the disability plan constituted sex discrimination because “it is the capacity to become pregnant which primarily
62
differentiates the female from the male.”
Congress agreed with the Gilbert dissents and prospectively overruled the majority’s decision by adding pregnancy discrimination to
63
Title VII’s definition of sex discrimination. The purpose of Title VII
is to provide equal employment opportunities to all groups of em64
ployees and thus prohibit private and public employers from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such

53

Id. at 138.
Id. at 139.
55
Id. at 138, 139 & n.17.
56
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 138, 139 & n.17.
57
Id. at 146 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also id. at 160 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58
See id. at 148 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
59
Id. at 152 & n.5.
60
See id. at 149.
61
See id. at 160.
62
Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 161–62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
63
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 678, 679 &
n.17 (1983) (noting that the PDA was designed to overrule the Gilbert decision).
64
See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 288 (1987) (emphasizing that the purpose of Title VII is ‘“to achieve equality of employment opportunities
and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of .
. . employees over other employees.’” (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 429–430 (1971))).
54
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individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Congress
legislated that “[t]he terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’
include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of preg66
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” The second clause of
the definition states that “women affected by pregnancy, childbirth,
or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe
benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar in their
67
ability or inability to work.” This clause mandates equal employment treatment, including insurance coverage, for pregnancy-related
conditions as for other disabilities and thus overturns the Supreme
68
Court’s specific holding in Gilbert.
IV. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT POST-PDA ENACTMENT
While the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of whether
women undergoing IVF are protected under the PDA, it has provided
some guidance regarding the scope and proper interpretation of the
Act. The Court has decided three cases addressing the PDA, none of
69
which specifically address infertility treatments. Two of the decisions, however, provide particularly useful guidance to the infertility
analysis because one of the cases involved the related issue of equality
65

42 U.S.C. § 2000e(2)(a)(1) (2006).
§ 2000e(k) (emphasis added).
67
Id.
68
See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 678, 679 & n.17. The Court used legislative history to bolster its conclusion that the PDA’s second clause was meant to directly repudiate Gilbert. Id. For example, the Court cited the remarks of Representative Hawkins:
H.R. 5055 does not really add anything to Title VII as I and, I believe,
most of my colleagues in Congress when title VII was enacted in 1964
and amended in 1972, understood the prohibition against sex discrimination in employment. For, it seems only commonsense, that since
only women can become pregnant, discrimination against pregnant
people is necessarily discrimination against women, and that forbidding discrimination based on sex therefore clearly forbids discrimination based on pregnancy.
Id. at 679 n.17 (quoting 123 CONG. REC. 10,581 (1977) (statement of Rep. Hawkins)).
69
See Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 210–11 (1991) (holding that
employer’s policy prohibiting all fertile women from having jobs involving actual or
possible lead exposure was facially discriminatory and violated the PDA); Cal. Fed.
Sav., 479 U.S. at 285, 287–88 (holding that the PDA is the floor beneath which pregnancy benefits cannot fall and that state statutes may provide more protection to
pregnant women); Newport News, 462 U.S. at 683–84 (holding employer’s insurance
coverage plan discriminatory against male employees and violative of the PDA where
it provided less extensive benefits for the pregnancy-related conditions of spouses of
male employees than for other medical conditions of spouses of female employees).
66
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70

of insurance coverage, and the other addressed discrimination on
71
the basis of “potential for pregnancy.”
A. Pregnancy Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination
72

In Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, the Supreme Court held that an employer must provide the same level of
health insurance coverage for the pregnancy-related medical conditions of the spouses of male employees as it does for all other medical
73
conditions of the spouses of female employees. In Newport News, the
employer’s health insurance plan provided complete coverage for the
pregnancy-related expenses of its female employees but limited preg74
nancy-related benefits for the spouses of male employees. The plan
also provided extensive coverage for all other medical conditions for
75
the spouses of female employees.
The Court followed the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) interpretive guidelines, which stated that “if an
employer’s insurance program covers the medical expenses of spouses of female employees, then it must equally cover the medical expenses of spouses of male employees, including those arising from
76
pregnancy-related conditions.” The Court reasoned that although
the PDA prohibits discrimination against female employees on the
basis of pregnancy, it never altered Title VII’s original prohibition
77
against discrimination on the basis of sex. Thus, the Court found
that the employer’s plan discriminated against married male employees because it provided them less comprehensive coverage than it
78
provided for married female employees.
B. The Definition of Pregnancy Includes the “Potential for Pregnancy”
79

In International Union v. Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court
addressed whether the employer’s fetal-protection policy constituted
80
sex discrimination in violation of Title VII. The employer, Johnson
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

See Newport News, 462 U.S. at 675–76.
See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 187–88.
462 U.S. 669 (1983).
Id. at 684.
Id. at 671.
Id. at 672.
Id. at 673.
Id. at 684–85.
Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676.
499 U.S. 187 (1991).
See id. at 190.
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Controls, Inc., manufactured batteries, in which lead was a primary
81
component. Because of the harmful effects of lead exposure on fetuses, the company implemented a “fetal-protection policy” that excluded all women who were pregnant or capable of becoming preg82
nant from working in a battery-manufacturing job.
The policy
required female employees to prove that they were not capable of re83
producing to obtain this particular job. Both the district court and
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit analyzed the policy as
facially neutral with a discriminatory effect on women’s employment
84
85
opportunities. Accordingly, applying the “business necessity test”
and granting summary judgment in favor of the employer, both
courts concluded that the employer’s policy was necessary to avoid
86
the substantial health risk to the fetus.
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit’s holding and
87
The Court
rejected its application of the business-necessity test.
held that the policy was facially discriminatory under the PDA, which
necessarily constitutes sex discrimination, because it “classified on the
basis of gender and childbearing capacity, rather than fertility
88
alone.” The policy classified on the basis of gender because it required only women to prove their lack of reproductive capacity despite evidence that lead exposure adversely affects the male reproductive system; consequently, the policy gave only men a “choice as to
whether they wish[ed] to risk their reproductive health for a particu-

81

Id.
Id. at 191–92.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 197–98.
85
The business-necessity test is used by courts to determine whether a disparateimpact claim—in which plaintiffs assert that an employer’s facially neutral policy has
a discriminatory effect on a protected group—is nonetheless valid because it is justified by business necessity. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971).
The business-necessity test includes a three-step inquiry: “whether there is substantial
health risk to the fetus; whether transmission of the hazard to the fetus occurs only
through women; and whether there is a less discriminatory alternative equally capable of preventing the health hazard to the fetus.” Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 194.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that there was a substantial health risk to the fetus;
the evidence of risk from the father’s exposure was speculative and unconvincing;
and the petitioners waived the issue of less discriminatory alternatives by not sufficiently presenting such alternatives. Id.
86
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 197–98.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 198.
82
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89

lar job.” Furthermore, the policy was also facially discriminatory
90
under the PDA because of its childbearing-capacity classification,
which excluded employees who were “pregnant or . . . capable of
91
bearing children.” Moreover, the Court noted that “the absence of
a malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy
92
into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect.” Consequently,
the Court rejected the more lax business-necessity test under which
facially neutral policies are analyzed and instead addressed whether
the policy satisfied the narrow bona fide occupational qualification
93
(BFOQ) defense to Title VII.
The BFOQ exception permits sex discrimination “in those certain instances where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular
94
business or enterprise.” Johnson Controls argued that female sterility constituted a BFOQ because the battery-manufacturing job compromised the safety of the unborn children of its fertile female em95
96
ployees.
The Court rejected this argument.
Because the
protection of fetuses was not necessary to the essence of battery manufacturing and because fertile women could perform the essential
duties of battery manufacturing as efficiently as all other employees,
97
Johnson Controls could not establish female sterility as a BFOQ.
89
Id. at 197. The Court reasoned that the employer was concerned only with the
safety of the unborn offspring of its female employees despite potential harms to the
offspring of male employees as well. Id. at 198.
90
Id. at 198–99.
91
See id. at 192.
92
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 199.
93
Id. at 199–200.
94
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2006).
95
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 206.
96
The Court stressed that the exception applied only in the narrow circumstances where sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the woman’s ability to perform
the job-related activities that go to the “essence” of the employer’s business. Id. Accordingly, in cases where the safety of a third party is at issue, such safety must be an
essential aspect of the employer’s business, and the woman’s sex, pregnancy, or reproductive potential must actually interfere with the woman’s ability to ensure the
safety of those third parties. Id. at 202–04. In Johnson Controls, the Court rejected
female sterility as a BFOQ because the essence of Johnson Controls’ business was battery manufacturing and not concern for children; thus, the fetal-protection policy
was not essential to its business. Id. at 207. “Concerns about the welfare of the next
generation [cannot] be considered a part of the ‘essence’ of Johnson Controls’ business.” Id. The potential fetuses were “neither customers nor third parties whose
safety [was] essential to the business of battery manufacturing.” Id. at 203. Additionally, the status of a woman’s fertility did not relate to, let alone interfere with, her
ability to perform the job’s duties. Id. at 206.
97
Id.
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Ultimately, the Court concluded that the Johnson Controls policy violated Title VII, as amended by the PDA, because the PDA was
meant “to protect female workers from being treated differently from
98
other employees simply because of their capacity to bear children.”
And in Johnson Controls, the employer determined the eligibility of
workers based on their reproductive capacity or potential for preg99
nancy, which constituted pregnancy discrimination.
V. DEFINING PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION: A DIFFICULT TASK
PRODUCING CONSIDERABLE CONFUSION AMONG THE FEDERAL COURTS
While the Supreme Court has offered some general guidance on
the scope of the PDA, the task of deciding whether infertility is a
pregnancy-related condition under the PDA has been largely left to
the lower federal courts. The lower courts have taken varying approaches in interpreting the PDA in the infertility context, which has
100
led to confusion and inconsistent results among them.
A. The Eighth Circuit: Infertility Is Not a Related Medical Condition
under the PDA
101

In Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether infertility was a medical condition related to pregnancy or childbirth within the meaning
102
of the PDA. It held that infertility fell outside the PDA’s protection
Fertile women . . . participate in the manufacture of batteries as efficiently as anyone else. Johnson Controls’ professed moral and ethical
concerns about the welfare of the next generation do not suffice to establish a BFOQ of female sterility. Decisions about the welfare of future children must be left to the parents . . . rather than to employers
who hire those parents.
Id.
98

Id. at 205.
“Under this bill, the treatment of pregnant women in covered employment must focus not on their condition alone but on the actual effects of that condition on their ability to work. Pregnant women who
are able to work must be permitted to work on the same conditions as
other employees . . . .
.....
“ . . . [U]nder this bill, employers will no longer be permitted to force
women who become pregnant to stop working regardless of their ability to continue.”
Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-331, at 4–6 (1977)).
99
Id. at 211.
100
See discussion infra Part VI.
101
95 F.3d 674 (8th Cir. 1996).
102
Id. at 679.
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because infertility did not include pregnancy, childbirth, or a related
103
medical condition.
The plaintiff in Krauel was diagnosed with endometriosis and, as
104
a result, was unable to conceive naturally.
The plaintiff-employee
paid for her own infertility treatment because her employer’s medical
benefits plan did not provide coverage for treatment of infertility
105
problems.
The plan excluded insurance coverage for both male
106
When the plaintiff’s employer
and female infertility treatments.
denied reimbursement for her infertility treatments, the plaintiff
filed suit and alleged that the employer’s denial of coverage for infer107
tility treatments violated the PDA. The plaintiff argued that infertility was a medical condition related to pregnancy, and therefore, the
employer’s refusal to provide coverage for infertility treatments was
discrimination on the basis of a “related medical condition” under
108
the PDA. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument and affirmed
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the em109
ployer.
The court employed a canon of statutory construction, ejusdem
110
generis, meaning that when a general term follows a specific term,
the general term should be understood as referring to matters similar
111
to those in the specific terms. Here, the general term was “related
medical condition,” and the specific term was “pregnancy or childbirth.” Consequently, the court held that the plain language of the
PDA did not suggest that “related medical conditions” should be applied to conditions outside the context of pregnancy and child112
birth.
The court concluded that, because infertility, which “prevents conception,” is “strikingly different” from pregnancy and
childbirth, “which occur after conception,” it was not a “related med113
ical condition” as contemplated by the PDA.

103

Id. at 679–80.
Id. at 675–76.
105
Id. at 676.
106
Id. at 680.
107
Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 681.
110
The term ejusdem generis means “of the same kind.” WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
253 (2000).
111
Id. at 253–54.
112
Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679.
113
Id.
104
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The court distinguished Johnson Controls, in which the Supreme
Court held that sex discrimination included discrimination on the
114
basis of “potential pregnancy.”
While “potential pregnancy” is a
gender-specific medical condition because only women can become
pregnant, infertility is gender neutral because it affects both men and
115
women. Accordingly, the court held that the employer’s refusal to
cover the cost of infertility treatments was not sex discrimination be116
cause both men and women are affected by infertility.
The court
further supported its holding by stating that the fact that neither the
legislative history of the PDA nor the EEOC guidelines made any explicit reference to infertility treatment suggests that infertility is out117
side the purview of the PDA’s protection.
Finally, the Krauel court expressly rejected the reasoning in Pa118
courek v. Inland Steel Co., in which the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that infertility is a medical condition re119
lated to pregnancy for purposes of the PDA.
The court in Krauel
found the result in Pacourek unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the
district court relied too heavily on the legislative history of the PDA,
120
in which infertility is not explicitly mentioned, and second, the defendant in Pacourek, unlike the defendant in Krauel, did not concede
that the employer policy was gender-neutral and applicable to all in121
Because the policy at isfertile employees, both male and female.
114

Id. at 680.
Potential pregnancy, unlike infertility, is a medical condition that is
sex-related because only women can become pregnant. In this case,
because the policy of denying insurance benefits for treatment of fertility problems applies to both female and male workers and thus is
gender-neutral, Johnson Controls is inapposite.

Id.
115

Id.
Id.
117
Id. at 679–80.
118
858 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (N.D. Ill. 1994).
119
Krauel, 95 F.3d at 80.
120
Id. The Pacourek court cited legislative history to support the notion that Congress intended for the PDA to provide broad protection to women against any and all
employment discrimination based on gender. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1402. The
court quoted Senator Harrison Williams’s statement, “‘[T]he overall effect of discrimination against women because they might become pregnant, or do become
pregnant, is to relegate women in general, and pregnant women in particular, to a
second-class status. . . .’” Id. (quoting 123 CONG. REC. 29,385 (1977)). The Pacourek
court also relied on Representative Ronald Sarasin’s statement that the PDA gives a
woman “‘the right . . . to be financially and legally protected before, during, and after
her pregnancy.’” Id. (quoting 124 CONG. REC. 38,574 (1978)).
121
Krauel, 95 F.3d at 680. In Krauel, the insurance policy denied benefits to all infertile employees. Id. In Pacourek, on the other hand, the plaintiff claimed that she
116
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sue in Krauel applied to all infertile employees regardless of sex, the
court held that it was gender-neutral and thus did not violate the
122
PDA.
B. The Second Circuit: Providing Less Complete Coverage for Female
Infertility Does Not Run Afoul of the PDA
123

In Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., the Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the same issue that was presented in Krauel—whether
an employer’s denial of health coverage for infertility treatments that
124
The court
can be performed only on women violated the PDA.
held that because the employer’s health-benefits plan’s exclusion of
surgical impregnation procedures disadvantaged infertile male and
female employees equally, the plan did not violate Title VII, as
125
amended by the PDA.
During the course of her four years of employment at Franklin
Covey Sales, Inc., the plaintiff-employee, an infertile female, underwent several infertility procedures, including IVF, to achieve preg126
nancy with her husband. The plaintiff-employee sued her employer
after being denied coverage for the cost of her infertility treatments—IVF, intrauterine insemination, and injectable fertility
drugs—under her employer’s self-insured health-benefits plan (“the
127
Plan”). The Plan entitled employees to coverage for “medically necessary procedures,” including a variety of infertility products and
128
But the Plan exprocedures and surgical infertility treatments.
pressly excluded surgical impregnation procedures, including IVF
129
and intrauterine insemination. The plaintiff claimed that the Plan
violated several statutes, including the PDA, because it provided inferior coverage for infertility treatments than for illnesses unrelated to
130
pregnancy.
was terminated for needing sick leave due to a medical condition that rendered her
infertile. Pacourek, 858 F. Supp. at 1397.
122
Krauel, 95 F.3d at 680.
123
316 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2003).
124
Id. at 340.
125
Id. at 346.
126
Id. at 341.
127
Id. at 340–42.
128
Id. at 341 (“Examples of covered surgical infertility treatments include[d] procedures to remedy conditions such as variococeles (varicose veins in the testicles
causing low sperm count), blockages of the vas deferens, endometriosis, and tubal
occlusions.”).
129
Saks, 316 F.3d at 341.
130
Id. at 342.
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Despite noting that the phrase “related medical conditions” encompassed more than pregnancy itself—a concession that the Krauel
court was unwilling to make—the court rejected the plaintiff’s PDA
131
claim. The court framed the issue as infertility, separate and apart
132
from its treatment. As a result, the court found that Johnson Controls
provided support for its interpretation of the PDA—that discrimination based on “fertility alone” and, by implication, infertility alone—
does not violate the PDA because infertility affects men and women
133
in equal numbers. Accordingly, the court concluded that the Plan
did not violate the PDA because its denial of coverage for surgical
impregnation procedures constituted discrimination based on fertility alone and thus disadvantaged both male and female employees
134
equally. The court further noted the anomalous implications of including infertility within the protection of the PDA—that only infertile women would be part of the protected class, even though the af135
fected class includes both men and women.
Therefore, the court
held that infertility is not a pregnancy-related condition under the
136
PDA and that infertility discrimination does not violate the PDA.
C. The Seventh Circuit: The Issue is Not Infertility Alone
In a case of first impression, Hall v. Nalco Co., the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals confronted the issue of whether the plaintiffemployee, Hall, stated a cognizable PDA claim against her employer
137
who terminated her after she took time off to undergo IVF.
The
court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
employer and held that an adverse employment action based on a
gender-specific infertility treatment, such as IVF, constitutes sex dis138
crimination under Title VII, as amended by the PDA.
Hall was a sales secretary for Nalco Company when, in March
139
2003, she requested a leave of absence to undergo IVF treatments.
140
Hall’s supervisor approved the leave.
Hall’s IVF cycle was unsuc131

Id. at 345–46.
Id.
133
Id. at 346.
134
Id.
135
Saks, 316 F.3d at 346.
136
Id. at 345–46.
137
Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 2008).
138
Id. at 649.
139
Id. at 645. The court noted that each IVF cycle takes several weeks to complete
and that several cycles may be required to achieve pregnancy. Id. at 645–46.
140
Id. at 646.
132
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cessful, however, and in July 2003, she requested another leave of ab141
sence to begin that August. Shortly after her request, Hall’s supervisor told her that the sales office was merging with another office
142
and that her position would be terminated as a result. Hall’s supervisor also told her that “her termination ‘was in [her] best interest
143
due to [her] health condition.’”
Prior to her termination, Hall’s
supervisor discussed her potential termination with the company’s
employee-relations manager whose notes from the conversation referred to Hall’s “absenteeism—infertility treatments” and stated that
144
Hall “missed a lot of work due to health.”
Hall filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC, and she subsequently sued her employer and alleged discrimination on the basis
145
of sex in violation of Title VII. In her complaint, Hall alleged that
she was terminated for being “a member of a protected class, female
146
with a pregnancy-related condition, infertility.”
The district court
found that Hall did not state a claim cognizable under the PDA and
147
granted summary judgment to her employer.
The court reasoned
that infertility is a gender-neutral condition, and thus, infertile wom148
en are not a protected class under the PDA.
The Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision and held
149
First, the court rethat Hall presented a cognizable PDA claim.
jected the district court’s characterization of the issue as “infertility
150
alone” as well as Hall’s theory that infertile women are a protected
151
class under the PDA.
The PDA, the court held, was not meant to
create a new protected class or to create “new rights or remedies” but
was intended only to “clarif[y] the scope of Title VII by recognizing
certain inherently gender-specific characteristics that may not form
152
the basis for disparate treatment of employees.”
Thus, the Hall
court recognized that classifications based solely on the gender-

141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id.
Id.
Hall, 534 F.3d at 646.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hall, 534 F.3d at 649.
Id. at 648.
Id. at 649 n.3.
Id. at 647.
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neutral condition of infertility are not prohibited by the PDA. To
154
this extent, Hall is consistent with Krauel and Saks.
Relying on Johnson Controls, the Hall court stated that, even
where infertility is at issue, the “employer conduct complained of
155
must actually be gender neutral to pass muster.” Here, the court held,
the issue was not infertility alone but also whether the employer conduct was gender-neutral in response to the employee’s need to un156
dergo IVF. To assess whether an employer action violates Title VII,
the court reiterated the test for sex discrimination: “whether the employer action in question treats an employee ‘in a manner which but
157
for that person’s sex would be different.’”
The court analogized the employer conduct in this case to the
employer conduct in Johnson Controls, where the employer barred only fertile women from employment even though the lead exposure
158
affected the fertility of both men and women. The court concluded
that Nalco’s conduct suffered the same defect as the employer conduct in Johnson Controls—that the employer policy “did not classify
based on the gender-neutral characteristic of fertility alone, but rather on the gender-specific characteristic of childbearing capacity, or
‘potential for pregnancy,’ and was therefore invalid under the
159
PDA.”
The court reasoned that where an employer bases an employment decision on an employee’s absences related to IVF treatments,
153

Id. at 648.
The [Johnson Controls] Court held the policy was invalid under the PDA
because it “classifie[d] on the basis of gender and childbearing capacity, rather than fertility alone.” Implicit in this holding is that classifications based on “fertility alone”—and by like implication, infertility
alone—are not prohibited by the PDA, which reaches only genderspecific classifications. As the Second Circuit noted in Saks, this conclusion is necessary to reconcile the PDA with Title VII because
“[i]ncluding infertility within the PDA’s protection as a ‘related medical condition[]’ would result in the anomaly of defining a class that simultaneously includes equal numbers of both sexes and yet is somehow
vulnerable to sex discrimination.”
Id. (quoting Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 346 (2d Cir. 2003) (footnotes
and citation omitted)).
154
See discussion infra Part VI.A.
155
Hall, 534 F.3d at 648.
156
Id. at 648–49.
157
Id. at 647 (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711
(1978)).
158
Id. at 648–49.
159
Id. at 648 (quoting Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198–99
(1991)).
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such decisions are not gender-neutral because IVF is a surgical im160
pregnation procedure that can be performed only on women. Employees who undergo IVF will necessarily always be women because
161
only women have the capacity to bear children.
Thus, the court
concluded that “Hall was terminated not for the gender-neutral condition of infertility, but rather for the gender-specific quality of child162
bearing capacity.”
Although the court did not reach the merits of the case, as to
whether Hall was terminated on the legitimate basis of restructuring
or on her absence for IVF treatments, it did suggest the latter because
of the timing of her termination—shortly after her first failed IVF
cycle and request for another leave of absence—and the employee163
relations manager’s notes expressly referring to her IVF treatments.
The court concluded that Hall’s allegations presented a cognizable
Title VII claim “[b]ecause adverse employment action based on
childbearing capacity will always result in ‘treatment of a person in a
164
manner which but for that person’s sex would be different.’”
VI. MAKING SENSE OF THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT IN LIGHT
OF KRAUEL, SAKS, AND HALL
The conflict between the courts arises from a threshold ques165
tion—how to frame the issue. In Krauel and Saks, the courts framed
160

Id. at 648–49.
Hall, 534 F.3d at 648–49.
162
Id. at 649; see also Erickson v. Bd. of Governors of State Colls. & Univs. for Ne.
Ill. Univ., 911 F. Supp. 316, 320 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that female employee
stated a claim under Title VII because she was terminated for undergoing fertility
treatment and that her termination was thus based on her capacity to become pregnant).
163
Hall, 534 F.3d at 649.
164
Id. (quoting L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711
(1978)).
165
See also Cintra D. Bentley, Comment, A Pregnant Pause: Are Women Who Undergo
Fertility Treatment to Achieve Pregnancy Within the Scope of Title VII’s Pregnancy Discrimination Act?, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 391, 416 (1998).
The problem stems from how this issue is approached and subsequently framed. Proponents of including women undergoing fertility treatment within the PDA aver that the diagnosis of infertility cannot be bifurcated from its treatment. This belief allows proponents to frame the
issue as: whether women undergoing fertility treatment are included in
the scope of the PDA. Conversely, because opponents do not, or cannot, acknowledge that the two aspects of infertility cannot be bifurcated, opponents frame the issue as: whether women who are infertile
are included in the scope of the PDA. This explains why a court may
conclude that the phrase “treatment for a medical condition related to
pregnancy” does not include women undergoing fertility treatment:
161
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the issue as whether infertility is a “related medical condition” under
166
the PDA. Because infertility is gender neutral, the courts answered
167
in the negative.
The Hall court, on the other hand, did not separate infertility from the context of IVF; instead, the court framed the
issue as whether women undergoing IVF can present a cognizable
168
claim under the PDA.
The Hall court noted that IVF is related to
pregnancy because it involves the “potential for pregnancy” and requires that the person receiving treatment have childbearing capaci169
ty.
By ignoring the connection between IVF and childbearing ca170
pacity, the Krauel and Saks courts viewed infertility in a vacuum.
A. The Krauel and Saks Decisions Only Scratch the Surface of the
Infertility Issue
In Hall, the Seventh Circuit distinguished Krauel and Saks, each
of which involved insurance coverage for infertility treatments rather
171
than the termination of a female employee undergoing IVF. While
the Seventh Circuit did not necessarily disagree with the decisions
172
reached by the Eighth and Second Circuits in Krauel and Saks, respectively, its reasoning conflicts with certain aspects of the arguments employed in these cases.
The Krauel court dismissed the plaintiff’s PDA claim because it
173
held that infertility is not related to pregnancy. The court reasoned
that infertility, which prevents conception, is not a condition related

the condition of infertility is being considered outside the context of
diagnosis and treatment.
Id.
166

See Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996)
(“[T]he issue before us is whether the District Court properly determined that
treatment of infertility is not treatment of a medical condition related to pregnancy
or childbirth.”); see also Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 2003)
(“Whether the PDA’s prohibition of discrimination on the basis of pregnancy and
‘related medical conditions’ extends to discrimination on the basis of infertility.”).
167
See Krauel, 95 F.3d at 680; see also Saks, 316 F.3d at 346.
168
See Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The district court’s
emphasis on this issue of ‘infertility alone’ is therefore misplaced in the factual context of this case.”).
169
See id.
170
See Bentley, supra note 165, at 416–17 (analyzing the Krauel case and concluding that “consideration of infertility in this vacuum is the root of the most common
objection to finding that women undergoing fertility treatment are within the scope
of the PDA: that infertility is a gender-neutral condition”).
171
See Hall, 534 F.3d at 648.
172
See id.
173
Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1996).
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to pregnancy and childbirth, which occur post-conception.
The
Krauel court drew a bright line at pregnancy to implicate the PDA; essentially, the court made a blanket rule that infertility cannot serve as
the basis for pregnancy discrimination because it is not “related to”
pregnancy. This kind of analysis, however, is superficial because it
looks only at the condition of infertility and stops there instead of also looking at infertility in the context of both the treatment and employer action at issue. Additionally, as the Hall court noted, this reasoning was nullified by Johnson Controls, in which the Supreme Court
held that the PDA applies to classifications based on “potential for
175
pregnancy” in addition to actual pregnancy.
Contrary to Krauel’s
rationale, a woman’s protection under the PDA does not exist only
176
during her nine months of pregnancy. A woman is part of the protected class whenever an employer action adversely affects her on the
basis of a biological difference, such as the capacity to become preg177
nant, regardless of temporal considerations.
The Krauel line of reasoning is similar to that employed by the
majority in Gilbert. Krauel created two classes, fertile and infertile employees, as the Gilbert majority differentiated between pregnant and
178
nonpregnant employees. In both cases, the courts upheld the employment policy because the class claiming discrimination included
179
As Justice Stevens wrote in his Gilbert disboth men and women.
sent, with which Congress agreed, the flaw in this reasoning is viewing
the condition at issue, pregnancy in Gilbert and infertility in Krauel, in
a “vacuum” instead of looking at the condition in a practical context—that pregnant persons can only be women and infertile persons

174
Id. at 679–80. The Eighth Circuit extended its Krauel rule to the issue of contraception in In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litigation, 479 F.3d 936, 942
(8th Cir. 2007). Using the same statutory construction, the Union Pacific court held
that contraception is not a medical condition associated with “pregnancy” or “childbirth.” Id. The court reasoned that contraception, like infertility, prevents conception, and pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical conditions can occur only after
conception. Id.
175
Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 648 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008).
176
See generally Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) (holding
that classifying groups on the basis of potential for pregnancy is the same as sex discrimination).
177
See Kocak v. Cmty. Health Partners of Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 469–70 (6th
Cir. 2005) (holding than an employee need not be pregnant at the time of the discrimination to bring a claim under the PDA).
178
See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 134–35 (1976), superseded by statute,
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076; Krauel v.
Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1996).
179
Gilbert, 428 U,S. at 136–40, 145–46; Krauel, 95 F.3d at 680.
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180

undergoing IVF can only be women.
In the case of infertility, the
practical context includes which gender the infertility treatments affect and how employers treat their employees with regard to genderspecific infertility treatments.
The Second Circuit in Saks applied the Krauel reasoning to
uphold an employer plan that provided complete insurance coverage
for male infertility treatments but excluded coverage for surgical im181
pregnation procedures.
Like the Eighth Circuit in Krauel, the
Second Circuit held that “infertility standing alone does not fall within the meaning of the phrase ‘related medical conditions’ under the
182
PDA.”
The court refused to include infertility within the PDA because it would create a protected class—infertile persons—which in183
In Saks, however, the plaintiff
cludes both men and women.
claimed that the employer plan provided complete surgical infertility
coverage for male employees but incomplete coverage for female
184
employees.
Thus, the issue stated in Hall was not the genderneutral condition of infertility alone but rather the gender-specific
185
condition of childbearing capacity. The health-benefits plan in Saks
fell within the PDA because it discriminated against employees on the
basis of childbearing capacity by excluding coverage for infertility
treatments performed only on women on account of their childbear186
ing capacity.
Making blanket assertions that infertility is or is not
included within the purview of the PDA allows courts to avoid the
specific employer action at issue and the class of persons it affects.
Ironically, the Seventh Circuit would probably have come to the
same conclusion—albeit employing a different analysis—as the
Eighth Circuit did in Krauel. The Seventh Circuit agreed that discrimination on the basis of infertility alone, a gender-neutral condi187
tion, does not violate the PDA. Therefore, if an employer, like the
one in Krauel, provides no coverage for infertility treatments or terminates an employee merely for being infertile, then the issue is infertility alone and the employer does not violate the PDA. On the
180

See Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 161–62.
Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 346–47 (2d Cir. 2003).
182
Id. at 346.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 342. The court disagreed with the plaintiff’s contention that the employer plan provided inferior coverage for female infertility. Id. at 346. It stated, however, that even if it did agree with the plaintiff that the plan provided inferior coverage
for women, “such inferior coverage would not violate the PDA.” Id.
185
See Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 649 (7th Cir. 2008).
186
See Saks, 316 F.3d at 342.
187
Hall, 534 F.3d at 648.
181
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other hand, if the employer provides coverage for male infertility
treatments but not for female infertility treatments, like the employer
in Saks, then the issue is not infertility alone because the employer is
discriminating on the basis of childbearing capacity, a gender-specific
condition. Likewise, if an employer terminates an employee for the
reason that she is undergoing IVF, then the employer is discriminating on the basis of childbearing capacity because it is that capacity
which necessarily requires the woman, not the man, to undergo
188
IVF.
In sum, courts must conduct more than a superficial analysis—examining infertility only on its surface—and instead more closely scrutinize infertility in the context of its treatment to determine
whether the employer action is gender neutral.
B. The Limitations of the PDA Even After Hall
The Hall decision provides and promotes greater protection
from adverse employment actions on the basis of gender-specific infertility treatments by highlighting the shallow analysis with which
other courts have addressed the infertility issue. But the practical
significance of the decision may be disappointing for many working
women undergoing IVF.
First, employment actions based on infertility alone are not un189
lawful because they affect men and women equally. Only where an
employer takes into consideration a woman’s gender-specific characteristic, reproductive capacity, in taking adverse actions against her
190
does impermissible gender discrimination arise.
Accordingly, employers may lawfully exclude insurance coverage for all infertility
treatments because such an employer action is gender-neutral—that
is, the exclusion affects men and women in equal proportion and is
191
not based upon any gender-specific quality. Both men and women
will presumably have to face this employer policy in equal measure by
paying out of their pockets for infertility treatments for themselves or
192
their spouses.
In fact, an employer will invite sex discrimination
claims from infertile male employees if it provides insurance coverage

188

Id. at 648–49.
Id. at 648.
190
See id. at 648–49.
191
See, e.g., Saks, 316 F.3d at 346.
192
See id. at 347 (“[M]ale and female employees afflicted by infertility are equally
disadvantaged by the exclusion of surgical impregnation procedures . . . . “).
189
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193

for female infertility treatments only. Therefore, the PDA does not
194
compel employers to provide coverage for IVF.
In contrast, adverse employer actions, such as demotion or termination, based not on infertility alone but rather on infertility
treatment that can be performed only on women because of their
childbearing capacity—such as IVF—could lead to a valid PDA
195
claim. Men and women do not have to face this employer action in
equal measure; women bear this burden because men do not have to
196
take extensive time off to undergo IVF treatments.
Additionally,
whereas women who undergo IVF may be viewed by their employer as
potentially pregnant (thus requiring insurance coverage and more
197
time off in the future), men can never be viewed this way. Therefore, for employers to take adverse employment action against women on the grounds that they are taking time off to undergo IVF is unlawful discrimination.
Even though women who are terminated for undergoing IVF
may have a valid PDA claim, the impact of the Hall decision is further
limited by the fact that Title VII requires equal treatment, not better
198
treatment. Unfortunately, even though Hall may seem like a victory
193
The Supreme Court has held that both male and female employees are protected under the PDA because the PDA does not change Title VII’s original prohibition against sex discrimination. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 681–82 (1983); see Katherine E. Abel, Comment, The Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment: An Inconceivable Union,
37 CONN. L. REV. 819, 846–47 (2005) (“Congress simply could not have intended the
PDA to serve as a statute that in effect discriminates against infertile male employees
by providing superior coverage to infertile female employees.”).
194
If the medical condition at issue is gender neutral, as is infertility, and the employer’s action is gender-neutral and it applies its policy equally to all of its employees, then it does not violate the PDA because it is based on infertility alone. See
Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 648 (7th Cir. 2008).
195
See id. at 649.
196
See id. at 648–49 (“Employees terminated for taking time off to undergo IVF—
just like those terminated for taking time off to give birth or receive other pregnancyrelated care—will always be women”); see also Bentley, supra note 165, at 423.
197
See Pacourek v. Inland Steel Co., 858 F. Supp. 1393, 1401 (N.D. Ill. 1994)
(holding that “[d]iscrimination against an employee because she intends to, is trying
to, or simply has the potential to become pregnant is . . . illegal discrimination”).
198
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 291 (1987) (holding that
although the PDA requires equal treatment, not better treatment, for pregnant employees, state laws can require better treatment); see Thomas H. Barnard & Adrienne
L. Rapp, The Impact of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act on the Workplace—From a Legal
and Social Perspective, 36 U. MEM. L. REV. 93, 110–11 (2005).
The protections afforded by the PDA, however, are limited by its promise of equal—but not special—treatment. Not all adverse employment
actions taken against pregnant women (or women affected by pregnancy-related conditions) are prohibited by the PDA. Specifically, fed-
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for infertile women, its impact is restricted because the employer
does not commit discrimination if the employer would have fired any
employee under similar circumstances. “The Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires the employer to ignore an employee’s pregnancy,
but . . . not her absence from work, unless the employer overlooks the
comparable absences of nonpregnant employees in which event it
199
would not be ignoring pregnancy after all.”
For example, if the
employer would have fired a male employee for taking time off to
undergo cosmetic surgery, then a female employee terminated for
absenteeism related to IVF will likely not be successful in bringing a
PDA claim. Only where an employer singles out a gender-specific
procedure like IVF for adverse employment treatment does a viable
claim of sex discrimination arise. A final limitation of the Hall decision is that its effects are potentially restricted to those women living
in the Seventh Circuit. Thus, the PDA does not provide the kind of
broad protection that women need when they are trying to build a
family through IVF.
VII. FEDERAL LEGISLATION IS STILL NECESSARY AFTER HALL
Two separate forms of federal legislation are still necessary after
Hall. First, Hall highlighted the need for Congress to clarify the definition of “related medical conditions” under the PDA so that women
can achieve uniform results when they sue their employers for taking
adverse employment actions against them on the basis of absences in
200
connection with infertility treatments.
Second, and more impor201
tantly, federal legislation such as the Family Building Act of 2009 is
necessary to mandate infertility insurance so that infertile couples can
afford to experience one of life’s greatest joys—have children. Currently, the PDA, the ADA, and the FMLA provide some protection
against adverse employment actions, but they do not provide much
202
hope for requiring infertility insurance.

eral law “only requires that pregnant employees be treated the same as
other employees similar in their ability or inability to work.”
Id. (quoting William G. Phelps, What Constitutes Termination of Employee Due to Pregnancy in Violation of Pregnancy Discrimination Act Amendment to Title VII of Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(k), in 130 A.L.R. FED. 473 (1996)).
199
Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (citations
omitted).
200
See discussion infra Part VII.A.
201
See discussion infra Part VII.D.
202
See discussion infra Parts VII.B–C.
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A. The PDA Should Be Clarified but Would Still Not Require Infertility
Insurance
Since the enactment of the PDA, the judiciary has grappled with
how to properly interpret which “related medical conditions” fall
within its scope. Because infertility is a significant unsettled area of
law within PDA jurisprudence, PDA compliance is more complex and
confusing for both employers and employees. This confusion is reflected in the significant rise in PDA charges filed with the EEOC
203
since 1997.
As the number of PDA charges steadily increase, the
judiciary is being asked to play the central role in protecting women
from employment discrimination.
Infertile women are essentially asking the courts to determine
two issues: first, whether the PDA can be used as a means of compelling an employer to provide insurance coverage for infertility treat204
ments; and second, whether the PDA can be used as a tool to seek
damages against an employer who has taken an adverse employment
action against a woman for taking time off to undergo infertility
205
treatment. Unfortunately, the federal courts cannot give a clear answer on either issue, and the litigation surrounding the PDA has resulted in a lack of uniformity among the courts in regard to the scope
206
of “related medical conditions” under the PDA.
Because of the magnitude and complexity of pregnancy discrim207
ination issues today, the courts are not the appropriate forum to
203

The EEOC received 6196 charges of pregnancy-based discrimination in 2009, a
nearly 56% increase from 3977 charges in 1997. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, Pregnancy Discrimination Charges, EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY
1997–FY 2009, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/pregnancy.cfm
(last visited Feb. 23, 2010).
204
See, e.g., Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 316 F.3d 337, 340–42 (2d Cir. 2003);
Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996).
205
See e.g., Hall v. Nalco Co., 534 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 2008).
206
Compare Saks, 316 F.3d at 346 (holding “[t]hat infertility standing alone does
not fall within the meaning of the phrase ‘related medical conditions’ under the
PDA”), and Krauel, 95 F.3d at 679–80 (holding “[t]hat the District Court properly
concluded that infertility is outside of the PDA’s protection because it is not pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition”), with Hall, 534 F.3d at 648–49
(discussing how discrimination on the basis of childbearing capacity is prohibited by
the PDA).
207
In addition to infertility treatments, cases involving the scope of the PDA regarding contraception have been hotly debated. The lower federal courts have been
reaching divergent decisions when considering contraception. Compare Cooley v.
Daimler Chrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp. 2d 979, 984–85 (E.D. Mo. 2003) (holding that
denying insurance coverage for a prescription medication that allows women to control their potential for pregnancy is a sex-based exclusion under the PDA), and
Erickson v. Bartell Drug Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 1266, 1271 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (holding
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shape the contours of the PDA. Having a child is a major life event
that should not hinge on a court’s use of a particular canon of statutory interpretation, framing of the issue, or survey of legislative history that does not address the specific pregnancy-related issues that are
currently important. The level of delicacy and controversy surrounding these issues requires a uniform approach developed by Congress.
The only equitable and practical way to develop guidance defining
the responsibilities of employers and the rights of women in the
workplace is through legislation or regulations clarifying the meaning
of “related medical conditions” under the PDA.
Such clarifying legislation would achieve consistency for similarly
situated plaintiffs, reduce the number of PDA charges filed each year,
and follow the broader and more practical approach espoused in
Hall. But even if Congress prohibits employer discrimination against
women for undergoing gender-specific infertility treatments, it would
likely protect women only from adverse employment actions taken
against them for absenteeism arising from infertility treatments because only women have to miss work to undergo surgical impregnation procedures. As for insurance coverage, the PDA has never been
interpreted to require insurance coverage for such treatments as long
208
as employers offer the same coverage to all of their employees.
B. Little Hope for Infertility Insurance Under the ADA and the FMLA
Women undergoing IVF may have an alternative avenue for financial relief under the ADA. The ADA prohibits employers from
discriminating against qualified individuals on the basis of disabili209
ty.
The ADA defines “disability” as “a physical or mental impair210
ment that substantially limits one or more . . . major life activities.”
In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme Court held that reproduction is a
211
major life activity. Thus, plaintiff-employees may sue their employ-

that excluding prescription contraceptives from insurance coverage was sex discrimination under the PDA), with In re Union Pac. R.R. Employment Practices Litig., 479
F.3d 936, 942 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that “the PDA does not require coverage of
contraception because contraception is not ‘related to’ pregnancy for PDA purposes
and is gender-neutral”).
208
See discussion supra Part VI.B.
209
42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006). “The term ‘qualified individual’ means an individual who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires.” Id. §
12111(8).
210
Id. § 12102(2)(A).
211
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998).
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ers under the ADA on the theory that infertility is a disability impair212
ing a major life activity—reproduction.
The ADA may provide a successful cause of action where the
employee is suing the employer for taking an adverse employment ac213
tion against her for taking time off to treat her disability.
For example, a jury could find that granting Hall’s requests for time off is a
214
The
“reasonable accommodation” that her employer must make.
ADA, however, is not likely to provide an impetus for employers to
provide insurance coverage for infertility treatments. As with the
PDA, employers do not violate the ADA as long as they offer the same
coverage for all employees, even if that means no coverage is offered
215
to anyone.
216
Likewise, claims brought under the FMLA would suffer the
same fate. The FMLA entitles individuals who cannot perform their
217
regular job functions because of a “serious health condition” to
twelve weeks of leave as well as restoration of their former position—
218
The FMLA
or an equivalent position—upon returning to work.
212
See, e.g., LaPorta v. Wal-Mart Stores, 163 F. Supp. 2d 758, 763 (W.D. Mich.
2001). In LaPorta, the plaintiff employee asserted the ADA as one of her claims
against her employer for terminating her after she took time off to undergo infertility treatment. Id.
213
See, e.g., id. at 769–70. The LaPorta court denied summary judgment to the
employer on the issue of whether the employer wrongfully terminated the infertile
employee on the basis of her absences from work to undergo infertility treatment because the ADA gave the employee the right to “reasonable accommodations” for her
disability of infertility. Id. Thus, the court recognized that the plaintiff had a cognizable ADA claim against her employer. Id.
214
See, e.g., id. The ADA requires employers to make “reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual
with a disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006).
215
See Saks v. Franklin Covey Co., 117 F. Supp. 2d 318, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting the plaintiff’s ADA claim because the employer’s refusal to provide infertility
insurance “d[id] not offer infertile people less pregnancy and fertility-related coverage than it offer[ed] to fertile people”), aff’d in part, remanded in part, 316 F.3d 337
(2d Cir. 2003); see also Jessica L. Hawkins, Note, Separating Fact from Fiction: Mandated
Insurance Coverage of Infertility Treatments, 23 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 203, 213 (2007)
(“[S]o long as insurers and employers offer the same insurance coverage to all its
employees, they do not violate the ADA by refusing to cover infertility treatments.”).
216
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2654 (2006).
217
“The term ‘serious health condition’ means an illness, injury, impairment, or
physical or mental condition that involves—(A) inpatient care in a hospital, hospice,
or residential medical care facility; or (B) continuing treatment by a health care provider.” § 2611(11).
218
§ 2612(a)(1)(D) (“[A]n eligible employee shall be entitled to a total of 12
workweeks of leave during any 12-month period . . . [b]ecause of a serious health
condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position
of such employee.”); § 2614(a).

CUSHING_FINAL FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1726

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

11/8/2010 4:12 PM

[Vol. 40:1697

protects women whose IVF procedure is successful because the sta219
tute expressly authorizes employee leave for the birth of a child.
But whether the FMLA can protect women against adverse employment actions for the actual process of undergoing IVF is unclear.
Such protection depends on the facts of the case—for example, how
severely the infertility treatments are impacting the woman’s ability to
function—as well as the court’s interpretation of what constitutes a
“serious health condition.” Moreover, the FMLA does not require
employers to provide infertility insurance but rather requires only
220
unpaid leave for eligible employees.
Therefore, infertile women
should turn to the legislature to create a new federal mandate rather
than ask the judiciary to broadly interpret the express terms of al221
ready-existing laws—a task many courts are hesitant to do.
C. The Limitations of State Law Coverage for Infertility Insurance
222

Although fifteen states have enacted statutes mandating insurance coverage for infertility treatments, each state’s mandate varies in
the amount of insurance coverage that employers are required to

219

§ 2612(a)(1)(A).
See § 2612(a)(1)(D).
221
See, e.g., Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996)
(narrowly interpreting the PDA’s “related medical condition” and holding that “the
District Court properly concluded that infertility is outside of the PDA’s protection
because it is not pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition”).
222
These states include Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Texas, and West Virginia. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-85-137, 23-86-118 (West, Westlaw
through 2009 Reg. Sess.); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (West 2008); CAL.
INS. CODE § 10119.6 (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-536 (West, Westlaw
through 2010 Supp.); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (Westlaw through the 2009 3d
Spec. Sess.); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/356m, 125/5-3 (West, Westlaw through P.A.
96-885 of the 2010 Reg. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 19-701 (West, Westlaw
through all ch. of the 2009 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assem.); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15810 (West, Westlaw through all Ch. of the 2009 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assem.); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47H (West, Westlaw through Ch. 46 of the 2010 2d Ann.
Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176A, § 8K (Westlaw through Ch. 46 of the 2010 2d Ann.
Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176B, § 4J (West, Westlaw through Ch. 46 of the
2010 2d Ann. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 176G, § 4 (Westlaw through Ch. 46 of the
2010 2d Ann. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-22-1521, 33-31-102 (Westlaw through
2009 Legis.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:48-6x, 17:48A-7W, 17:48E-35.22 (West 2008); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §17B:27-46.1x (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2J-4.23 (West 2007); N.Y.
INS. LAW §§ 3216, 3221, 4303 (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1751.01(A)(7) (West, Westlaw through 2009 File 20 of the 128th Gen. Assem.); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 27-18-30, 27-19-23, 27-20-20, 27-41-33 (Westlaw through Ch. 365 of the
Jan. 2009 Sess.); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1366.001–.006 (Vernon, Westlaw through the
end of the 2009 Reg. and 1st Called Sess. of the 81st Leg.); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3325A-2 (West, Westlaw through H.B. 4040 of 2010 Reg. Sess.).
220
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provide and the requirements that women must meet to qualify for
223
coverage. State infertility-insurance laws contain several limitations,
and while female employees can lobby their state legislature to pass
legislation mandating any coverage or more comprehensive coverage
224
for infertility treatments, such actions may be futile.
Twelve states have “mandate to cover” laws, which “require insurance companies to cover infertility treatment” in every health
225
226
plan.
Two states, California and Texas, have “mandate to offer”
laws, which require insurance companies to offer coverage for infer227
tility treatment, but “[e]mployers are not required . . . to purchase
228
this additional coverage.” Some states require coverage or an offer
229
of coverage for IVF only, and others require coverage for all infertil230
ity treatments except for IVF.
Additional state-law limitations exist in the form of eligibility requirements for coverage. Many states limit the number of times that
a patient may undergo fertility treatment before insurance coverage
is no longer provided, require a period of years (usually two to five)
of infertility before a couple is eligible for coverage, require that the
couple have tried less expensive procedures first, or require that the
231
couple be married and that the donor sperm be from the husband.
232
Finally, four states also impose age requirements.
223

See infra notes 225–235 and accompanying text.
See id.
225
Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Insurance Coverage for Fertility Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/
Default.aspx?TabId=14391 (last visited March 22, 2010).
226
Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., State Infertility Insurance Laws,
http://asrm.org/insurance.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2010); Hawkins, supra note
215, at 214.
227
Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 226.
228
ARONSON, supra note 1, at 269.
229
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-85-137(a) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (Westlaw with amendments through the 2009 Third
Spec. Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., INS. §§ 15-810(b) (West, Westlaw through all Ch. of the
2009 Reg. Sess. of the Gen. Assem.); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1366.003 (Vernon, Westlaw through the end of the 2009 Reg. and 1st Called Sess. of the 81st Leg.).
230
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55(a)-(b) (West 2008); N.Y. INS. LAW §
3221(k)(6)(C)(v) (McKinney 2006 & Supp. 2010).
231
See ARK. INS. DEP’T, RULE AND REGULATION 1, §§ 1(5)(B), (C)(1)–(2) (1991),
available
at
http://www.insurance.arkansas.gov/Legal%20DataServices/rulesandregs/rnr01.pdf
(requiring that the couple be married, that the woman’s egg be fertilized by her
husband’s sperm, and that the couple “have a history of unexplained infertility” for
at least two years in order to quality for coverage); HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A116.5(a)(3)-(5) (Westlaw with amendments through the 2009 3d Spec. Sess.) (imposing three eligibility requirements for insurance coverage: the couple has been infer224
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In addition to the state statutes’ internal limitations, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) exempts self-funded
233
Thus, self-insured employers are
insurance plans from state law.
not subject to the minimum infertility-insurance requirements imposed by state law. This is a significant limitation on the protection
of state law because a majority of covered workers participate in in234
surance plans that are completely or partially self-insured. Finally,
state law is limited by the “religious employer” exemption. Six states
have an exemption for religious employers whose religious tenets are
inconsistent with providing insurance coverage for infertility treat235
ments. Because of the limitations of state law, a federal mandate is
more appropriate because it establishes a minimum level of uniformity among the states.

tile for at least five years, the couple has unsuccessfully tried other treatments, and
the woman’s eggs must be fertilized by her spouse’s sperm); MD. CODE ANN., INS. §§
15-810(c)(2)-(4) (West, Westlaw through all Ch. of the 2009 Reg. Sess. of the Gen.
Assem.) (requiring that the woman’s egg be fertilized by her spouse’s sperm, that the
couple have a two-year history of infertility, and that they have exhausted less expensive treatments first); id. § 15-810(d) (allowing entities to limit coverage to three IVF
attempts per birth not to exceed $100,000 total); see also Hawkins, supra note 215, at
214–19 (discussing state-law requirements for insurance coverage).
232
“Connecticut allows coverage to be excluded when a person turns 40; New Jersey requires coverage for
patients age 45 or younger; New York’s coverage applies from age 21 to 44; and
Rhode Island sets age limits of 25 to 40, but only for female patients.” JESSICA ARONS,
CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FUTURE CHOICES: ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND
LAW
9
(2007)
(internal
citations
omitted),
available
at
THE
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/12/pdf/arons_art.pdf.
233
29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2006); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 63–65
(1990) (holding that ERISA, not state law, regulates self-insured plans).
234
Hawkins, supra note 215, at 220 n.125 (citing Kaiser Family Found., Employer
Health Benefits 2005 Annual Survey, http://www.kff.org/insurance/7315/sections
/ehbs05-sec10-1.cfm (last visited May 22, 2010) (noting that “54% of covered workers
in 2005 [were] in a plan that [was] completely or partially self-funded”)).
235
These states include California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey,
and Texas.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55(f) (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38a509(c)–(e), 38a-536(c)–(e) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Supp.); 215 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/356m(b)(2) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 96-882 of the 2010 Reg.
Sess.); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810(e) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Reg. Sess.); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17:48-6x(b), 17:48A-7w(b), 17:48E-35.22(b) (West 2008); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17B:27-46.1x(b) (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §26:2J-4.23(b) (West 2007);
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1366.006 (Vernon, Westlaw through the end of the 2009 Reg.
and 1st Called Sess. of the 81st Legislature); see ARONS, supra note 232, at 42 n.45.
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D. The Family Building Act Is the Best Option for Mandating
Infertility Insurance
The most compelling option for women who need insurance
coverage for infertility treatment is to lobby their representatives in
Congress to pass the Family Building Act of 2009 (“the Act”), pro236
posed by Representative Anthony Weiner in the 111th Congress.
The Act is not subject to as many restrictions as state infertilityinsurance laws. First, the Act requires insurance carriers to cover the
237
costs of infertility treatments including all ARTs. Second, the Act is
238
not preempted by ERISA.
Instead, the Act amends the Public
Health Service Act and ERISA to require insurance coverage for the
239
Third, the Act applies to all employers—
treatment of infertility.

236
Family Building Act of 2009, H.R. 697, 111th Cong. (2009), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=
f:h697ih.txt.pdf. On January 26, 2009, the Act was introduced and referred to the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, the House Committee on Education
and Labor, and the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. See
Library of Congress, Bill Summary and Status for the 110th Congress (2007–2008),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/D?d111:1:./temp/~bdjKRz::|/
bss/111search.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2009). The bill has been introduced by Representative Anthony Weiner in every session of Congress since 1999. See Family
Building Act of 2007, H.R. 2892, 110th Cong. (2007), available at,
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110_cong_bills&docid=
f:h2892ih.txt.pdf; Family Building Act of 2005, H.R. 735, 109th Cong. (2005), available
at,
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=109_cong_
bills&docid=f:h735ih.txt.pdf; Family Building Act of 2003, H.R. 3014, 108th Cong.
(2003) available at, http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
108_cong_bills&docid=f:h3014ih.txt.pdf; Family Building Act of 2001, H.R. 389,
107th
Cong.
(2001),
available
at,
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_bills&docid=f:h389ih.txt.pdf; Family Building Act
of 1999, H.R. 2706, 106th Cong. (1999), available at, http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=106_cong_bills&docid=f:h2706ih.txt.pdf.
237
H.R. 697 § 2708(a)(1), 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgibin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_bills&docid=f:h697ih.txt.pdf.
238
See Hawkins, supra note 215, at 219 n.122. ERISA preempts any state law “relating to any employee benefit plan” and thus significantly limits the effectiveness of
state mandates for insurance coverage. Id.
239
The Family Building Act of 2009 states the following findings:
(1) Infertility is a disease affecting more than 6,000,000 American
women and men, about 10 percent of the reproductive age population.
(2) Recent improvements in therapy make pregnancy possible for
more couples than in past years.
(3) The majority of group health plans do not provide coverage for infertility therapy.
(4) A fundamental part of the human experience is fulfilling the desire
to reproduce.
H.R. 697 § 1.
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and contains no exemption for religious employers —as well as all
241
people, regardless of age.
Finally, the Act also provides the floor,
not the ceiling, of insurance coverage; that is, it does not preempt
242
state law that provides greater benefits to infertile couples.
The Act does, however, retain some common state-law limitations—albeit less stringent ones—on insurance coverage to achieve
cost-effectiveness. First, the Act provides insurance coverage for
ARTs only where “the participant or beneficiary has been unable to
bring a pregnancy to a live birth through less costly medically appropriate infertility treatments for which coverage is available under the
243
insured’s policy, plan, or contract.” Furthermore, the Act limits the
fertility procedures covered to those that the Secretary of Health and
244
Finally, the Act imHuman Services deems “non-experimental.”
poses a lifetime cap of six on the number of egg retrievals that can be
245
covered by insurance.
After four egg retrievals are performed, insurance is no longer required to cover additional retrievals unless a
live birth results from one of the egg retrievals; in that case, two more
246
egg retrievals are covered, for a maximum of six egg retrievals.
The Act provides the most promising way for infertile couples to
receive insurance coverage that will enable them to undergo infertility procedures because it recognizes the significance of the dream of
having children and appropriately addresses the financial obstacles

240
The absence of an exemption in the statute would likely overcome a constitutional challenge based on the First Amendment’s Free Exercise of Religion Clause.
The constitutional issue is nearly identical in contraception-insurance cases. Two
states have upheld state laws that mandate insurance coverage for contraception
without providing an exemption for religious employers. See Catholic Charities of
the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 528 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that state’s
contraceptive-equity act mandating that health-insurance plans that provide prescription-drug coverage also cover prescription contraceptives did not violate the state
constitution’s free-exercise clause); Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 91–94 (Cal. 2004) (holding that the state’s contraceptiveequity act mandating that certain employer health and disability plans that cover prescription drugs also cover prescription contraceptives did not violate state constitution’s free-exercise clause even when reviewed under strict scrutiny).
241
See generally H.R. 697.
242
Id. § 2708(h).
243
§ 2708(b)(2)(A)(i).
244
§ 2708(b)(1). The Secretary makes this determination “after consultation with
appropriate professional and patient organizations such as the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine, RESOLVE, and the American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists.” Id.
245
§ 2708(b)(2)(A)(ii).
246
Id.
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that put that dream at risk. At the same time, the Act is economical
and includes provisions to minimize the cost to employers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Women undergoing IVF constitute a class vulnerable to adverse
employment actions, whether it is because employers view them as
potentially becoming pregnant or whether employers simply do not
want to pay for the cost of the infertility treatment. Infertility affects
women in a unique way in that their childbearing capacity requires
them to undergo time-intensive surgical impregnation procedures.
Confronted with this reality, the Hall court provided women with
broader protection under the PDA by recognizing that it is a woman’s
childbearing capacity, not her infertility, which distinguishes her experience with infertility from that of a man. This biological difference, the capacity to become pregnant, exposes women to employer
actions that endanger their workplace status.
Because employers are not required to provide full or even partial coverage for infertility treatments in every state, national guidelines are necessary to adequately protect women trying to conceive via
IVF. In order to provide this nationwide, comprehensive protection
for women, Congress should clarify that the scope of the PDA encompasses employer actions that discriminate on the basis of a woman’s childbearing capacity or other sex-specific conditions related to
pregnancy. This clarifying legislation would prohibit employers from
terminating female employees based on their need to undergo IVF
because such action would constitute pregnancy discrimination.
While a broader definition of the protected class would come
closer to providing women with equal opportunities in the workplace,
the PDA is still inadequate to compel employers to provide insurance
coverage for infertility treatments. Given the importance of having a
family, and the rise in technology that has allowed couples to achieve
pregnancy, denying infertile couples a chance at parenthood would
be unfair. Therefore, a uniform policy of insurance coverage, such as
the Family Building Act of 2009, is needed to provide millions of infertile couples with the ability to create a family.

